One of the most important decisions regarding reverse logistics (RL) is whether to outsource such functions or not, due to the fact that RL does not represent a production or distribution firm's core activity. To explore the hypothesis that outsourcing RL functions is more suitable when returns are more variable, we formulate and analyze a Markov decision model of the outsourcing decision. The reward function includes capacity and operating costs of either performing RL functions internally or outsourcing them, and the transitions among states reflect both the sequence of decisions taken and a simple characterization of the random pattern of returns over time. We identify sufficient conditions on the cost parameters and the return fraction that guarantee the existence of an optimal threshold policy for outsourcing. Under mild assumptions, this threshold is more likely to be crossed, the higher the uncertainty in returns. A numerical example illustrates the existence of an optimal threshold policy even when the sufficient conditions are not satisfied and shows how the threshold for outsourcing decreases while the probability of crossing any fixed threshold increases with the return fraction.
logistics provider (3PRLP). This typically is an irreversible decision, because the chosen strategy, once adopted, will not be changed frequently. The management of returns is complicated by the substantial uncertainties associated with their timing, volume and condition. This paper focuses on how the uncertainty in the amount of units returned each period affects the decision of whether or not to outsource their RL management.
Our central hypothesis is that outsourcing RL is more suitable when there is greater uncertainty about how many units may be returned. This hypothesis arose from a qualitative analysis of the published literature on outsourcing of RL, which is overviewed briefly in the next section. In Section 3, we formulate and analyze a Markov decision model of the outsourcing decision. The reward function includes the most significant components of the cost of either performing RL functions internally or outsourcing them, and the transitions among states reflect both the sequence of decisions taken and a simple characterization of the random pattern of returns over time. We assume that RL functions initially are performed internally. In order to focus simply on the outsourcing decision, we limit our attention to two possible actions in each period: either adjust internal capacity to match the expected number of returns in the next period, or switch permanently to outsourcing. By analyzing the cost and transition probability functions, in Section 4 we identify sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal monotone policy over the partially ordered state space, which reduces to a threshold of cumulative returns for any given capacity level, beyond which outsourcing is optimal. The conditions are relationships among the cost parameters and the product return fraction that could be verified easily. Finally, we show that under mild assumptions, this threshold is more likely to be crossed when the uncertainty in returns is higher. Section 5 contains a numerical illustration of the existence of an optimal threshold policy even when the sufficient conditions are not met. It also illustrates how the threshold for outsourcing decreases while the probability of crossing any fixed threshold increases with the variability in the return volume. Finally, in Section 6, we draw conclusions and outline future research that can be developed based on this work.
Literature Review on Outsourcing RL Functions
The perceived importance of RL has increased lately. A recent estimate of annual sales of remanufactured products exceeds $50 billion in the United States alone (Guide and van Wassenhove, 2003) . There are no worldwide estimates of the economic scope of reuse activities, but the number of firms engaged in this sector is growing rapidly in response to the opportunities to create additional wealth and the enactment of extended producer responsibility legislation in several countries. In a survey of current literature, Dowlatshahi (2005) identified the present state of theory in RL.
A number of researchers have addressed problems and opportunities in RL management. Such management of RL systems is complicated by factors that are less prevalent in the forward supply chain, such as the uncertainty in product returns. Recent work by Nakashima et al. (2004) illustrated how this uncertainty, which they characterized in terms of a virtual inventory level, can be modeled in a Markov decision process for controlling a remanufacturing system. Multiple criteria may require consideration, such as in the selection of alternatives for product end-of-life disposition (Bufardi et al., 2004) .
As in the forward supply chain, some firms may opt to outsource logistical functions.
In general, outsourcing can be defined as acquiring services from external service providers (Grover et al., 1994 ). This practice is increasingly pursued by organizations looking for cost benefits, operational efficiency, improved customer service and a better competitive position (Lieb and Randall, 1996; Boyson et al., 1999, Arroyo and Gaytán, 2007) . Several streams of literature explain the bases of outsourcing decisions. Examples of these strands are Transactional Cost Theory (Williamson, 1979) , Resource-based View (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) , and evolutionary economics (Mahnke, 2001) . Outsourcing research has focused extensively on the elaboration of the outsourcing process -identification of the outsourcing need, pros and cons of outsourcing, third party selection, establishment of the relation, and control and revision -however, few authors propose practical frameworks for guiding managers through the process of deciding when to outsource.
Van Laarhoven et al. (2000) define the outsourcing of logistics activities as "…activities carried out by a logistics service provider on behalf of a shipper and consisting of at least management and execution of transportation and warehousing. In addition, other activities can be included, for example, inventory management, information related activities … or even supply chain management." Razzaque and Sheng (1998) that the decision to outsource was driven by profit growth and increased focus on core competencies. They concluded that, because significantly greater cost savings occurred when multiple logistical functions were outsourced, the outsourcing decision should be made strategically rather than to remedy specific deficiencies. Insinga and Werle (2000) also emphasized the strategic nature of outsourcing decisions and suggested that firms should outsource activities for which internal capability is weak and the potential for gaining competitive advantage is low. An annual survey of large US manufacturers revealed that outsourcing of logistical functions had reached a record level in the most recent results reported (Lieb and Bentz, 2005) . Eighty percent of respondents outsourced at least one logistical function, most of whom outsourced several, and 37% reported contracting out reverse logistics (up from 26% in the previous year). Initiation of logistics outsourcing contracts was based primarily on cost, and significant impacts on cost reduction were For the particular case of RL functions, outsourcing to a 3PRLP has been identified as one of the most important management strategies in recent years. Meade and Sarkis (2002) noted the three different choices available: to do nothing, to develop an internal RL function, or to find a 3PRLP and partner with them. They developed a model for selecting and evaluating 3PRLP once the choice to outsource had been made. Krumwiede and Sheu (2002) considered a model for market entry by a 3PRLP, but Dowlatshahi (2000) warned that some potential 3PRLPs lack the required knowledge of RL networks. One of the most important issues is to define whether the firm considers RL activities as part of its core functions. When this is not the case, outsourcing might represent a good alternative in order to allow the firm to focus on its core activities (Wu et al., 2005) .
In a detailed qualitative analysis, Serrato (2006) found that some of the most important 3PRLPs are found in industry sectors with high return variability and a short product life cycle. High variability in returns reduces the economic feasibility of maintaining a firm's own RL facilities because the required capacity will be changing constantly. A faster response can be achieved by involving a 3PRLP, which specializes in these activities, and can take advantage of the economies of scale to convert RL functions into a profit-creating activity. On the other hand, not many 3PRLPs are active in industry sectors with lower return variability and longer product life cycles, because it is easier for the producer to develop its own facilities to deal with the return flow, even though RL may not be part of its core activities. Serrato (2006) developed a detailed analysis of these conclusions regarding outsourcing RL functions.
However, a qualitative analysis based on observation does not establish that observed practices are effective, nor does it explain how a specific characteristic such as return variability should influence the outsourcing decision. In general, outsourcing decisions are based on a variety of qualitative as well as quantitative considerations (Daugherty and Dröge, 1997 ). This paper's goal is to quantitatively examine the major characteristics that can be quantified so that the impact of return variability can be better understood as one input into a complex decision. To our knowledge, it is the first quantitative examination of the reverse logistics outsourcing decision. The cost relationships under which a threshold policy is shown to be optimal describe conditions under which return variability is an important consideration. The specific form of the threshold policy and the situations when the threshold is likely to be crossed identify the type of circumstance that should trigger a comprehensive study of possible outsourcing alternatives.
Markov Decision Model.
The model is designed to represent the major cost drivers in the outsourcing decision, the uncertainty in the return volume, temporal variability in sales, and the impracticality of multiple transitions between performing RL functions internally and outsourcing them. To focus on return volume variability, we assume that sales can be estimated accurately from relevant historical data and therefore are known. Returns depend on the amount of units previously sold and the fraction of them that will be returned through the firm's RL system. Time T corresponds to the end of the problem horizon, where no decision is taken. k t = RL capacity held by the firm at the beginning of period t, which represents the number of units that can be processed in a single period.
n t = Number of units sold and not returned at the end of period t,
The following assumptions underlie the Markov decision model (MDM):
The sales in each period of the study horizon are known, for instance, they can be estimated reliably from the sales history of similar products (Tibben-Lembke, 2002). a=1: Adopt an outsourcing strategy for the RL activities by having a 3PRLP perform such activities and taking the firm's RL capacity to zero; i.e., k t+1 = 0. Given that RL does not represent a core activity for the firm, it is also assumed that once the outsourcing decision is taken, it remains in place for the rest of the problem horizon. This assumption is consistent with a survey result that, whereas 62% of respondents either outsourced handling of product returns or expected to do so in the near future, only 4% reported having outsourced them previously but no longer (Boyson et al., 1999) .
Because t n is an integer for all t, the problem has a discrete state space.
3.1.3. Transition Probabilities.
As the returns in each period follow a binomial distribution derived from the system state, and given that the sales function is also known, the transition probabilities among states are defined as
, where for a = 0 we have: 
and for a = 1 we have:
That is, the action taken determines the next period's capacity, but the second state variable Define the following set of costs, where a capacity unit represents firm's ability to process one returned item during a single period:
Unit investment cost for increasing the firm's capacity ($/capacity unit). Given that RL does not represent a core activity for the firm, profits from remanufacturing are not considered. We assume the following relationships between the cost parameters: (4) states that the cost of decreasing the firm's capacity is no greater than the cost of maintaining it for an additional period. Also, (5) is reasonable because 7 c must cover both fixed and variable costs for the 3PRLP, whereas 4 c consists only of the variable cost for the firm. Because of the economies of scale expected to exist because RL is a core activity for the 3PRLP, fixed costs per unit for the 3PRLP are lower than fixed costs per unit for the firm. Note that 7 c represents the unit price charged by the 3PRLP, which it offers based on its own internal cost structure. In practice, contracts may include fixed fees and/or volume discounts, but we do not consider them in this paper. Also, (6) is appropriate because otherwise, all the 3PRLP's potential clients could keep their own capacity low and just pay the shortage cost rather than following an outsourcing option. On the other hand, inequality (7) represents a motivation to develop internal capacity, as the total internal cost of maintaining the capacity for one additional period and then processing one additional unit is less than the shortage cost for that unit.
With these cost parameters, the following reward structure is defined for actions a=0
⎦ be the expected reward at time 1 + t when the system is in state
and action a is taken. For a = 0, we have: 
where ( )
It is assumed that any unit that was not managed through the RL system in the period it was returned is lost and will not be remanufactured later.
Here, 7 c represents the payment made to the 3PRLP for all expected returns from period t+1 until the end of the horizon. Recall that, given that RL is not a core activity for the firm, it is assumed that the outsourcing option will remain in effect for the remainder of the planning horizon, once that option is taken. Recall also from assumption 1 that the future sales can also be estimated accurately. This function also implies that the 3PRLP has infinite capacity, given the fact that RL does represent a core activity for it.
The terminal reward in period T is:
, , , for 0,1 and 0
because the RL capacity defined by the firm is taken to zero in the last period, incurring the corresponding salvage value. Also, this function reflects the cost incurred by not being able to remanufacture any expected returned unit during period T or later.
System dynamics.
At the end of each period t the system: 
Given an initial system state (k 0 ,0), the problem is to find a sequence of decision
} that maximizes the total expected reward.
The optimal policy can be obtained by solving recursively: 
where ( ) 
A Threshold Policy
In principle, equation (11) can be solved recursively backwards from period T to identify an optimal action for each possible state. However, depending on the length of the study horizon, the sales volumes, and the granularity of the state space (i.e., the definition of a "unit" sold or processed), the number of states to be evaluated could grow very large. As
Puterman (1994) observes, in order to reduce the amount of computation and increase appeal to decision-makers and managerial insight, it is desirable to identify a simple form for an optimal policy. Based on a partial ordering of the state space, below we establish the existence of an optimal monotone policy that corresponds to a threshold (in terms of the cumulative returns given a particular capacity level), beyond which the outsourcing action a=1 is optimal. Such a form also facilitates exploration of conditions under which outsourcing is more likely to be optimal. Below this threshold, the firm should continue performing the RL activities internally (a=0). Next, conditions for the existence of an optimal deterministic nondecreasing policy are defined.
4.1 General conditions for the existence of a optimal monotone policy.
Sets of conditions exist that ensure that optimal policies are monotone in the system state (Puterman, 1994 ). For such a concept to be meaningful, it is required that the state have a physical interpretation and some natural ordering. The expression "monotone policy" refers to a monotone deterministic Markovian policy.
For the MDM proposed, the states are partially ordered in terms of the cumulative returned units w t . Specifically, for each t, let the states (k t , w t ) be strictly partially ordered as
, which is illustrated in Figure 2 . Figure 2 . Illustration of the strict partial state ordering.
In addition to the partial ordering defined, a cumulative probability is needed to identify the conditions for a monotone nondecreasing policy: 
where from (1): ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
One set of conditions stated by Puterman (1994) for the existence of a monotone optimal policy are: When all of these conditions are satisfied, there exists a monotone nondecreasing policy that is optimal.
Specific conditions for an optimal threshold policy
In order to prove that these five conditions are satisfied, the following lemma will be used:
Suppose X n is binomial with parameters n and r, where n = 2, 3, …, and 0 < r < 1.
. Then for any n and l = 1, 2, …, n-1,
Proof: In the Appendix.
Theorem 1 applies Puterman's conditions to the context of this paper. The managerial implication is that for any fixed capacity level, there exists a threshold number of cumulative returns such that outsourcing is optimal for any greater or equal number of cumulative returns.
Theorem 1
If ( The proof is presented in the following five subsections: This inequality can be analyzed in three cases. If t t n r k < , it is equivalent to:
which is satisfied, given inequality (4) In the first case, the cumulative returns in period t are greater than or equal to w l .
Then, the probability that such cumulative returns will equal or exceed w l in the next period is 1; i.e., the condition is satisfied as an equality. In the second case, the cumulative returns are already greater than w l in the right hand side of the inequality (w l ≤w t +i). This implies that the probability on the right hand side equals 1, so that the inequality holds regardless of the probability on the left hand side. Finally, for the third case, this condition can be rewritten as: 
This inequality holds when for a fixed capacity k t , the incremental effect on the reward of switching to an outsourcing strategy increases with the cumulative number of returned units w t . This condition can be rewritten as: 
c n i r k n r k c k n i r k n r ic irc c E X n r E Y n i r c E X n r E Y n i r i n
where, as in Condition 1, X (Y) is binomially distributed with parameters n t (n t -i), respectively, and r, and from Lemma 1 (a) and (b), the expressions that multiply c 4 and c 5 are nonnegative.
Consider the same three cases as for Condition 1. If t t n r k < , the inequality is: 
Considering that
, where each U j independently equals 1 with probability r and 0 otherwise, this inequality can be analyzed under the four possible cases shown in Table   1 . 
However given (3), inequalities (13) and (14) are redundant. Inequality (15) is equivalent to a lower bound on r: 
These bounds represent sufficient conditions on the return fraction in terms of the cost parameters to guarantee superadditivity of the reward function. Because they were obtained by a worst case analysis that ignores the probability distributions of X and Y, it is possible that less restrictive conditions could be found.
Condition 4.
This condition implies that the difference between the cumulative probability that returns exceed a given number when taking the outsourcing option and when performing RL activities internally, does not decrease with the cumulative number of returns. This condition can be written as: 
Implications.
Inequality (17) states a lower bound on the return fraction as a ratio of two quantities:
the opportunity (regret) cost 5 7 c c − of not taking the outsourcing option and incurring the corresponding shortage for a particular unit, and the difference between the shortage cost and the total cost of internal processing. The magnitude of the lower bound depends on the relationship between internal and outsourced costs of processing returns. Inequality (18) is an upper bound on the return fraction expressed as another ratio, where the numerator is the difference between the outsourcing cost and the internal variable cost and the denominator is the total internal investment and capacity cost. The magnitude of the ratio depends on the economies of scale achieved by the 3PRLP. Counter-intuitively, the bounds are wider when the unit outsourcing cost is large relative to the internal costs. It should be emphasized, however, that these inequalities represent sufficient rather than necessary conditions for the existence of an optimal nondecreasing policy. The numerical illustration in Section 5 shows that such a policy can exist even under severe violations of these conditions.
Impact of return uncertainty on crossing the threshold
The result of Theorem 1 implies that, in any period t: Proof: In the Appendix.
Note that the maximum value for the ratio 5 4 c c in (19) is a lower bound on the requirement that holds for states with any number of outstanding items, 2 n ≥ . In a practical situation, when n would be much larger, the inequality imposes no significant constraint on 5 4 c c .
Lemma 3:
Let ( ) ( ) Proof: In the Appendix.
Theorem 2:
Suppose an optimal nondecreasing policy exists and the conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied. 
which completes the proof.
Theorem 2 shows that the suitability of the outsourcing option increases when the return fraction increases because the threshold value does not increase and the probability of crossing any given level of cumulative returns does not decrease. Because the variance of the number of returns increases with 0.5 r ≤ , this result supports the hypothesis that greater variability in the return volume motivates outsourcing.
Numerical Illustration
To demonstrate the influence of higher uncertainty in the return volume on the suitability of an outsourcing option, consider a particular scenario defined by the parameters: and the sales function:
where M represents the maximum sales level experienced by the firm during the life cycle, and 3 = M in this numerical example. The values for the cost parameters satisfy conditions (3) to (7) but not the sufficient conditions (17) and (18) for the existence of an optimal nondecreasing policy. The lower bound on r from (17) Based on this, the program solves the MDM by using backward induction, and shows the optimal action to take at each decision epoch. Table 2 . Value of the threshold and the probability of crossing it for { } 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5 r = As can be seen in Table 2 , a greater uncertainty in the return volume (greater r ) increases the probability of crossing the corresponding threshold in each set of states; i.e., there is a greater probability that outsourcing ( 1 = a ) will be the optimal action to take. For example for t = 4, if r = 0.2 then for k 4 = 8r = 1.6 there is no outsourcing threshold, but if r = 0.4 then for k 4 = 4r = 1.6 a finite threshold of 8 units does exist. Also, if r = 0.3 then for k 4 = 8r = 2.4 the threshold value is 8 and the crossing probability is 0.001. If r = 0.4 then for the same capacity k 4 = 6r = 2.4, the threshold value drops to 7 while the crossing probability rises to 0.04. This example confirms that greater variability in the return volume increases the uncertainty about the volume of units put into the corresponding RL system, which motivates the firm to follow an outsourcing strategy and take advantage of the economies of scale by involving a 3PRLP in managing the returned items.
Conclusions and Future Work
A Markov Decision Model (MDM) for evaluating the decision to outsource RL is developed in this research. It considers several elements that are critical in defining the characteristics of a RL network, such as the uncertainty in the return volume, the length of the product life cycle, the sales behavior, the particular RL costs incurred, and the length of time defined for the existence of that RL system. In particular, the uncertainty implied in the MDM is represented by the number of returned units, which depends on the number of units outstanding in the market and the return fraction.
Some sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal monotone nondecreasing policy are derived as bounds on the return fraction defined by the cost parameters. The existence of an optimal monotone nondecreasing policy implies the presence of a threshold above which it is optimal to follow an outsourcing strategy for the RL system; otherwise, to continue performing the RL activities internally. This threshold is defined in terms of a partial ordering for the system states, where given a fixed capacity at a decision epoch, the states are ordered according to the cumulative returned units, such that if that volume goes above a particular level, then it is optimal to follow an outsourcing strategy and take advantage of the economies of scale implied by involving a 3PRLP, which has RL as its core function. The value of the threshold and probability it is crossed characterize the prevalence of outsourcing.
While the existence of an optimal monotone policy appeals to intuition and simplifies computation, its chief value in this paper is to assess conditions under which outsourcing is more likely to be optimal. The main result is that as the return fraction increases the outsourcing threshold is more likely to be crossed. Because the variance of the binomially distributed number of returns increases with reasonable values of the return fraction, this result supports the hypothesis that variability in return volumes motivates outsourcing RL.
A numerical illustration shows that an optimal threshold policy exists even when our sufficient conditions are not met. It confirms that, when the return fraction is higher, outsourcing thresholds are smaller and the probability of crossing them is higher.
Because the model presented here is the first to our knowledge to quantitatively examine the decision of whether or not to outsource RL, ample opportunity exists for further research that could relax the assumptions of the model, identify less restrictive conditions for existence of a monotone policy, or study the effect of other drivers for outsourcing.
By reconsidering the model assumptions, additional research could model more complex capacity and inventory management policies than the one considered here, either because the firm cannot adjust its capacity each period, or a different adjustment policy is found to result in better performance. In practice, firms do keep inventories of returned products even though their value frequently is declining rapidly. The irreversibility of the outsourcing decision assumed in this paper also could be relaxed, in view of the fact that the 3PRLP selected may fail to perform adequately. On the economic side, the potential for profits from reprocessing and selling returned items may be considered as a benefit of maintaining RL capacity internally. The model for contracting arrangements with the 3PRLP could consider a tiered pricing structure, capacity reservations, or other means by which the 3PRLP could cover its capacity investment costs and reduce risk.
Several problem parameters, such as the return fraction and/or the RL costs may not be constant during the product's life cycle. Nonstationary costs will be easy to incorporate, but variation in the return fraction will require more elaborate modifications to the analysis.
More generally, another area of research would identify the requirements for the existence of an optimal monotone nondecreasing policy, when the returns follow a probability distribution different than the one described in this paper. A different stochastic model for returns could allow investigation of the effects of separate changes in the mean and variance of returns per period.
Regarding the analysis, the sufficient conditions for the existence of a monotone policy found are not necessary, and it may be possible to find less restrictive ones by an average-rather than worst-case analysis. 
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where U = 1 with probability r and 0 otherwise. There are three possible cases for
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where, given that nr>m, the expression is also nonnegative. Finally, if nr m ≤ , then
. Then, to complete the conditioning argument: 
and since n is arbitrary, we have, by the transitive property: 
Proof of Lemma 2:
Let [ ] 
where (26) comes from the definition of w . Inequality (27) implies that the threshold is not greater than w when the return fraction increases by r Δ ; i.e., the threshold does not increase when the return fraction increases, as stated in (20) .
Given that by definition of w , inequality (26) is satisfied, and that the right-hand sides in both inequalities are equal (they do not depend on r ), inequality (27) will be satisfied as long as: 
where (28) can be rewritten as: 
Given (3) and (4), the following part of (29) is nonnegative: Consider the remaining elements of (29): The derivatives of f n and g n are discontinuous at r = j/n, j = 1, …, n-1, which implies that a separate expression is needed for the derivatives in each interval for r. For 1 , or equivalently 1, j j r j n r j n n + < ≤ < ≤ + where 2 j n < : for reasonable values of 4 5 c c < .
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) j j r j n r j n n Figure 1 . Relationship between RL chain and costs considered in the MDM. Figure 2 . Illustration of the strict partial state ordering. 
